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Intentional objects1
Tim Crane
Is there, or should there be, any place in contemporary philosophy of mind for the
concept of an intentional object? Many philosophers would make short work of this
question. In a discussion of what intentional objects are supposed to be, John Searle’s
answer to our question is brisk and dismissive:
an Intentional object is just an object like any other; it has no peculiar
ontological status at all. To call something an Intentional object is just to say
that it is what some intentional state is about. Thus, for example, if Bill
admires President Carter, then the Intentional object of his admiration is
President Carter, the actual man and not some shadowy intermediate entity
between Bill and the man.2
The last claim expressed here seems obviously correct. For on the face of it, Bill’s
admiration of President Carter makes direct contact with the man himself; Bill does
not first admire something else – some mental or non-mental ‘intermediary’ – and in
virtue of admiring this thing, he admires President Carter. This makes little
phenomenological or metaphysical sense, and there is no particular reason to believe
it. We should surely join Searle, then, in rejecting ‘shadowy intermediaries’ in
thought.
But the rest of this passage of Searle’s, it seems to me, is problematic. For one
thing, it is in need of an obvious and simple clarification, since as it stands it cannot
be true. But even once this clarification is made, Searle’s claim entails an absurdity
when combined with a familiar and recalcitrant fact about intentionality: that
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intentional states can be about things which do not exist. I will make the clarification
first, and then bring out the absurdity.
In elaborating his claim about intentional objects, Searle says that intentional
objects are ‘ordinary objects’.3 If he means by ‘object’ what is usually meant when
we contrast objects with properties, relations, events, propositions, facts or states of
affairs – that is, particular objects – then the claim that all intentional objects (defined
above as ‘what some intentional state is about’) are objects in this sense is simply
false. Intentional states can be about events, properties and all things in all the
ontological categories just mentioned. There is no reason to think that the only things
our intentional states are about are particular objects in the ordinary sense. So Searle
cannot mean object in this sense; he must rather mean something like ordinary
existing thing or entity (where thing or entity is the most general ontological category:
properties, relations and so on are all things or entities).  So now the claim that
intentional objects are ordinary objects just means that what intentional states are
about are ordinary existing entities.4
But once we make this clarification, and once we bring into play the idea that
intentional states can be about things which do not exist, then the absurdity of
Searle’s claim comes to the surface. For consider the conjunction of Searle’s two
claims with this idea:
(1) Intentional objects are ordinary existing entities.
(2) Intentional objects are what intentional states are about.
(3) Intentional states can be about things which do not exist.
It follows from (1)-(3) that some ordinary existing entities do not exist, which is
absurd, and clearly not what Searle has in mind. It might be thought that the way to
respond is to drop ‘existing’ in (1), but the conclusion that some ordinary entities do
not exist is only superficially less absurd. If there are entities which do not exist, then
they hardly deserve to be called ordinary.
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What has gone wrong? It seems that (1)-(3) cannot be true together; but which
of them is false? Claim (2) is simply a definition and so cannot be sensibly debated.
But is (3) true? It is certainly hard to deny. Consider a debate between an atheist and a
theist, and suppose for the sake of argument that the atheist is right: God does not
exist. (Let’s suppose that the debate they are having is a straightforward one over the
existence of the Christian God as traditionally conceived: the all-powerful creator of
the universe who loves us as a father loves his children etc.) If the atheist is right,
then the theist has been talking about (and thinking about) something which does not
exist. Yet the theist’s words made sense, it seemed that he was able to put these
thoughts about God into words. His thoughts are thoughts about something that does
not exist. Or consider H.H. Price, hallucinating a pile of leaves on his counterpane
under the influence of mescaline.5 If Price thought ‘That pile of leaves wasn’t there
this morning’ then he was thinking about something which does not exist: there is no
pile of leaves. And there are many other kinds of examples: from myth and fiction
(Pegasus), the history of science (Phlogiston, Vulcan), and from the experience of
after-images and double vision etc. Even if you thought you could explain away some
of these examples without appealing to the idea of ‘thinking about something which
does not exist’, the prospect of explaining all of them away seems unpromising.
So the initial simple plausibility of (1) is misleading; given (2) and (3), it
seems that we should abandon it. If we do, then it may seem too that we need a theory
of the special nature of these intentional objects. In appealing to intentional objects in
giving an account of perceptual experience, Gilbert Harman admits that he has no
‘fully worked-out account’ of intentional objects – implying that this is what is
needed for a proper account of perceptual intentionality. Harman agrees that it is no
solution to say that intentional objects are mental objects (or at any rate, that not all of
them are). When Ponce de Leon looked for the Fountain of Youth, he was not looking
for something in his (or anyone else’s) mind. So however the final theory of
intentional objects turns out, it ‘had better end up agreeing that Ponce de Leon was
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looking for something when he was looking for the Fountain of Youth, even though
there is no Fountain of Youth, and the theory had better not have the consequence that
Ponce de Leon was looking for something mental’.6
But if intentional objects are not mental objects, what are they? If we accept
(2) and (3), then on the face of it we must accept that some intentional objects do not
exist. So we need a theory of non-existent objects or entities. (Harman himself
mentions Terence Parsons’ theory.7) According to such theories, the things which
exist do not exhaust all the things that there are; for there are many things which do
not exist. Of all the things we think about, some of them (like Carter) exist, and some
of them (like Pegasus) do not. It could be said that Pegasus has being, but he does not
exist. And if we can think about impossible objects, then there are these things too.
They necessarily do not exist. It cannot be an objection to this theory that it denies
Quine’s view that the English quantifier ‘There are..’ expresses existence (so that
‘There are things which do not exist’ is a contradiction) since the theory is explicitly
proposed in opposition to the Quinean orthodoxy.8
But it seems to me that such a theory is fraught with problems. How are we
supposed to understand the distinction between being and existence? Specifying two
domains of quantification, one a subset of the other, is not enough by itself, since
what we need to understand is what distinguishes the things in the subclass (the
existent) from the things in the broader class (the entities, things which have being).
Moreover, the nature of the postulated entities is obscure. On the face of it, we do not
have any idea of what makes it the case that two people are thinking about the same
non-existent object. Indeed, intentional objects can be indeterminate, even in a sense
that vague objects (if there are such things) never are.  As G.E.M. Anscombe puts it,
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I can think of a man without thinking of a man of any particular height; I
cannot hit a man without hitting a man of any particular height, because there
is no such thing as a man of no particular height.9
So we need to understand not just the idea of objects which do not exist, but also the
fact that they can be indeterminate in this way. But what sense can be made of an
indeterminate object? The man who is of no particular height: what colour is his hair?
No particular colour? But that surely means: no colour at all. And how can anything
have hair without that hair being any colour at all? Is this just an expression of our
‘prejudice in favour of the existent’, that something which has hair has hair of some
particular colour? But what is the real alternative to this prejudice? The view, as far as
I can see, offers no real answer to these questions.
What has emerged is a dilemma: either deny that intentional states can be
about things that do not exist, or accept that there are non-existent objects. Neither
position is acceptable. The way out of the dilemma is to reject an assumption shared
by both unacceptable positions: that to be an intentional object is to be a thing or
entity of a certain kind. The position which denies (3) assumes that intentional objects
are just existing entities. The position which postulates non-existent objects assumes
that all intentional objects are entities, although some of them are non-existent ones.
The common assumption is that to be an intentional object is to be an entity. This is
what I shall deny.
This might sound perverse or paradoxical. If I am thinking about Carter,
Carter is the intentional object of my thought. Yet Carter exists, he is an entity. So
how can I deny that some intentional objects actually are entities? I do not deny this:
this is just another way of saying that some intentional objects exist and some do not.
What I am denying is that being an intentional object as such is being an entity of any
kind.
The basis of this view is a proper understanding of what an object is in this
context. We use the term ‘object’ in a number of different ways, and some of these
ways are very different from others. One is when we talk about physical objects. Here
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the word can be replaced by ‘thing’: my computer is a physical object; therefore it is a
physical thing. Interestingly the converse is not true: if x is a physical thing, it’s not
always true that x is a physical object. It makes sense to say that gravity is a physical
thing; but not that it is a physical object. Someone who says that love is a physical
thing is not thereby committed to its being a physical object. This supports my
suggestion above that ‘thing’ picks out a more general ontological category than
‘object’. So all physical objects are physical things, but not all physical things are
physical objects.
Contrast the phrases ‘object of attention’ or ‘object of experience’. As J.J.
Valberg has pointed out, we cannot replace the word ‘object’ in these phrases with
the word ‘thing’ and retain sense: ‘thing of attention’ and ‘thing of experience’ make
no sense.10 The word ‘object’ has a different meaning in these phrases than in does in
the phrases ‘physical object’, ‘material object’, ‘mental object’ and even ‘abstract
object’. This is the key to the idea that being an intentional object is not being a thing
of any kind. For ‘intentional object’ in this respect (unsurprisingly) is like ‘object of
attention’ rather than ‘physical object’. If it makes sense at all, ‘intentional thing’
means the same as ‘intentional entity’, which someone might take to mean
intensional entity, in the sense in which propositions and other intensions are
intensional entities. Whatever the merits of the view that there are intensional entities,
such entities are plainly not what is meant by talking of intentional objects. When I
consider my cat Jeffrey, it is the cat which is the object of my thought, the thing I am
thinking about. I am not thinking about an intension. I am thinking about a cat. So
even if there are intensional entities, this is not what intentional objects are.
When something is a thing of a certain kind, there are general conditions that
it meets which make it a thing of that kind. Here I do not want to propose any view
about what these conditions might be in any detail; I’m just assuming that we do have
an idea of such conditions, even if detailed accounts of them are disputable. For
example, it is a necessary condition for something’s being a physical object that it has
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a location in space-time. Or: it is a necessary condition of being a mental event that it
exhibits either consciousness or intentionality or both. To develop a full account of
mental and physical things or entities would be to elaborate what I shall call a
‘substantial’ conception of a thing or entity. A substantial conception of a thing tells
us about the nature of that thing. Ontology deals in such substantial conceptions: an
ontological theory of physical objects, for example, tells when such objects are the
same or different, what the necessary conditions for being such an object are, and
whether objects of these kinds are fundamental, or whether they reduce to other kinds
of entity (that is, whether their existence and nature consists in the existence and
nature of some other kind of thing).
What I am denying is that there is, or can be, any similarly substantial
conception of intentional objects. This is the mistake of both unsatisfactory theories
dismissed above: each theory assumes that they have to give an account of what
intentional objects are, and then goes on to say either (with Searle) that the existence
of intentional objects consists simply in the existence of some other ‘ordinary’
entities, or (with the theory of non-existent objects) that some intentional objects are
non-existent entities. There is no necessary condition which something must meet in
order to be an intentional object, in the sense of there being something substantial that
all intentional objects in themselves have in common. There can be no substantial
conception of intentional objects, since there is nothing entities have to be, in general
and in themselves, in order to be intentional objects. Intentional objects, considered as
such, have no nature.
Of course, it is true that all intentional objects are the objects of intentional
states or acts. (By ‘act’ I mean a mental phenomenon that has an object and has a
place in a time-series, like an act of judgement, or a decision.) But this doesn’t mean
that the nature of intentional objects is to be the objects of intentional states, in the
sense that the nature of physical objects is to have a certain spatio-temporal location
and to have certain physical properties. What is true, rather, is that something is an
intentional object only in so far as it is an object for some thinker or some subject.
‘Object’ in this sense makes sense only relative to ‘subject’. Objects are what is given
or presented to subjects in intentional states of mind. When a real thing is given or
presented to a subject there is nothing about it, considered in itself, which makes it
the object of that subject’s thought.
The fact that an intentional object is an object only for a subject entails the
possibility that something might be an object for me, say, but not for you; or that
certain kinds of minds or creatures can direct their minds on certain objects which are
unavailable to other kinds. If you are more musically sophisticated than me, then you
can hear things in music which I cannot; you may be able to hear an interrupted
cadence in a piece of music which I cannot. The cadence is an object of your musical
attention, but it is not an object of mine. It is an object for you but not an object for
me. The high-pitched sounds which dogs can hear are objects for them but not for us;
the colours of objects which sighted people see are objects for the sighted but not for
the blind.
The idea of an intentional object, then, is similar to the idea of a world, in the
sense in which a creature who is conscious can be said to ‘have a world’. It is in this
sense that the world of the blind is very different from the world of the sighted.
‘World’ in this sense is not, of course, the metaphysical idea of all that is the case or
the totality of facts. I can say that the world of the blind is different from the world of
the sighted without denying that there is one totality of facts. A.R. Luria’s famous
book, The Man with the Shattered World tells how the world is from the point of view
of a soldier who has suffered massive brain damage, resulting in chaotic visual
experience, impaired linguistic ability and little sense of himself as an integrated,
unified locus of thought and consciousness.11 The soldier’s world is different from
ours. It would be perverse to take this perfectly ordinary idiom to be purporting to
imply that there is more than one world, in the sense of more than one totality of
facts. Similarly, when I say that X is an intentional object for me but not for you
(because you cannot, for some reason, apprehend X in an act of thought, say) I do not
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mean to imply that X exists in my world but not in yours, or that X exists for me, but
not for you. X either exists or it does not. But whether or not it does has nothing to do
with whether it is an intentional object for me or for you. Nonetheless, two people’s
thoughts can have the same intentional object, when they are thinking about (looking
for, desiring, contemplating etc.) the same thing. To say that something is an object
for me does not imply that it cannot be an object for you.
The idea of an object in this sense plays an important role in the theory of
intentionality of Husserl and his followers. But in analytic philosophy, this kind of
idea has been somewhat neglected. There are a number of different sources of this
neglect. One is a deflationary tendency to treat the idea of an intentional object as a
merely grammatical idea. This is the approach taken in a classic paper by Anscombe.
12  Anscombe claimed that to be an intentional object is to be a kind of direct object in
the grammatical sense, that is, the object of certain transitive verbs, which she calls
intentional verbs. The comparison of grammatical and intentional objects is
illuminating; it shows again how the word ‘object’, used in both cases in contrast with
‘subject’, does not always mean what it does in (e.g.) the phrase ‘physical object’. A
direct object is just what plays a certain role in a sentence containing a transitive verb.
However, we can find this comparison illuminating without having to agree with
Anscombe that an intentional object is just the direct object of an intentional verb; i.e.
that the idea of an intentional object is really a grammatical idea. For one thing,
Anscombe’s criterion of what makes a verb intentional is unsatisfactory, on at least
two grounds. First, it is really a criterion of intensionality, and has often been pointed
out, intensionality and intentionality are importantly different concepts.13 And second,
Anscombe’s criterion fails to count ‘belief’ as an intentional verb (as she herself
admits). But surely an account of intentionality which does not put the concept of
belief at its centre is barely an account of intentionality at all.
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In any case, it would surely be surprising if the idea of an intentional object,
and related ideas like object of attention, object of experience and object of thought,
were mere shadows of the grammar of our language (unless, of course, one held the
implausible view that all philosophically interesting concepts were mere shadows or
artefacts of grammar). These ideas are phenomenological ideas, ideas we use in trying
to articulate to ourselves the fundamental nature of what our experience and thought
is like. Why should we expect the fundamental nature of experience and thought to be
explained in terms of grammar? If anything, the explanation should be the other way
around.
A more popular reason for the neglect of this idea of an intentional object in
recent years is a certain re-alignment in discussions of intentionality. One dominant
contemporary approach to the problem of intentionality has identified intentionality
with representation. States of mind are representations: an intentional state is one
which involves a representation of things as being a certain way. The state thus has a
representational or intentional content, which is how the world is represented as
being. A desire that p, a belief that p, an expectation or wish that p; all these mental
states have the same content, they involve a representation of the world as being the
p-way. In a desire, the world is desired to be the p-way, in a belief it is believed to be
the p-way, and so on. The fundamental notions here are representation, intentional
state, and intentional or representational content. One reason to avoid bringing in talk
of intentional objects may be the one I located in my discussion of Searle’s views
above: all intentional states are about something (they have a content) but what they
are about sometimes does not exist, so (given the equation of object and entity) their
‘aboutness’ in general cannot consist in a relation to an object/entity. So aboutness
should just consist in a state’s having an intentional or representational content. The
concept of an intentional object is not one which a fully worked-out theory needs to
employ.
I want to dispute this view, and argue for an indispensable role for the concept
of an intentional object. In fact, I think that the concepts of intentional object and
intentionality should be explained together with the concept of representation;
intentionality cannot be explained in terms of representation. I say this not because I
reject the idea of intentional content. On the contrary, I think we need both the idea of
intentional object and the idea of intentional content in a proper account of
intentionality.14 Two states of mind may have the same intentional object – they may
be about the same object – but differ in the way in which they present that object, or
in what they predicate of it. These differences are differences in content. I would also
claim that two intentional states may have the same content but differ in their objects
(indexical thoughts are an example) but this use of ‘content’ is controversial and I
won’t defend it here.  The content of a state of mind is, in a phrase of Valberg’s, what
you would put into words: when you put your thoughts into words, what you express
is the content. (This is assuming, of course, that you have the words into which to put
the thoughts. And this is also not to deny that there may be elements of content which
cannot be put into words. It’s just that what you do put into words, when you put your
thought into words, is the content.) So I do not replace the talk of content with talk of
objects; rather, I want to argue for an indispensable role for the idea of an intentional
object. So we should not replace talk of intentionality and intentional objects with talk
of representation or representational content. The two ways of talking should be
understood together.
At first sight, one way in which it might seem as if the idea of representation
is more straightforward than the idea of intentionality is that we are familiar with
many everyday concrete examples of representations: written and spoken sentences,
signs, pictures. Compared to these, the idea of something being an object of thought
can seem worryingly insubstantial and evanescent. After all, here are the concrete
things, the representations, before us: we can pick them up and manipulate them. Isn’t
this an indication that the idea of representation is a better starting point?
This is, of course, an illusion. Sentences and pictures are concrete
representations; but no-one thinks that they represent in and of themselves. They have
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their power to represent only derivatively, deriving from the states of mind of thinkers
who use them. To understand why these things are representations we need to appeal
to the thoughts, intentions, plans and desires of thinkers: in short, their intentional
states. Even those who follow Jerry Fodor, and think that these intentional states
themselves involve sentences in a language of thought, do not think this because they
think that sentences are in some way better equipped to represent the world, in and of
themselves. No, the justification for the language of thought hypothesis derives from
the systematic nature of mental processes, not from any assumption about the power
of sentences to represent.15 Those who defend the hypothesis are at pains to make it
clear that postulating sentences in the head is one thing, and explaining how those
sentences get their meaning – giving a ‘semantics for the language of thought’ – is
quite another.
So familiar concrete representations get their meaning from the use that is
made of them by thinkers. If we are to explain how the representational states of our
minds ‘get their meaning’ then we had better do this in some other way. In what way?
The standard approach among physicalist philosophers of mind is to give some
account of what some call the ‘representation relation’ in non-intentional (usually
causal) terms. But thus formulated, the project cannot succeed. For if it is possible to
represent things which do not exist, then there can be no representation relation,
since relations entail the existence of their relata. It follows from this that – whatever
the other problems with the idea that representation reduces to causation – causation
cannot underpin representation in general, since causation is a relation and
representation isn’t.16 Beliefs might be relations to mental sentences; they might be
relations to propositions; but none of this makes ‘x represents y’ express a relation, if
x can represent y when y does not exist.
These points might be acknowledged, but dismissed on the grounds that the
causal model of representation being assumed is far too crude. This it doubtless is; the
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question is whether the more sophisticated versions of the theory can avoid this
fundamental problem. The question is: where does one place the causal relation in a
more sophisticated account? What role, precisely, does causation play? Could one say
that causation can explain representation when the object represented does exist, but
not when it doesn’t? What, in that case, does one say about the case where the
represented object does not exist? One proposal is that we should explain the
representation in this case in terms of the represented item’s counterfactual causal
relation to the representation, rather than its actual causal relation.17  Thus we might
say, not that Pegasus causes my Pegasus-representations, but that Pegasus would
cause my Pegasus-representations were he to exist; or alternatively, that what makes a
representation a Pegasus-representation is that is would be caused by Pegasus in
worlds in which he exists.
But even if this counterfactual is true, it is hard to see the proposal as an
advance over the idea that one can represent things which do not exist. We started off
with the idea that one could represent something even if that thing does not exist.
Now this is supposed to be explained by the idea of a causal relation that does not
exist. We are still in the position of needing an explanation of how something (either
an object or a causal relation) which does not exist can be connected to an actual (not
a counterfactual) thought about that ‘something’. ‘Representation’ is certainly a good
word for this connection, but in that case we should not think we have explained the
representation of the non-existent in terms of a non-existent causal relation. How
could this be an advance in our understanding?
It seems to me, then, that the appeal to causation in the theory of
representation is a mere gesture unless it can say something more about the
representation of the non-existent. Of course, it is true that thinkers think about many
of the things they causally interact with, and that in many cases, it is hard to see how
they could have come to have thought about these things unless they had causally
interacted with them. But what we are after, presumably, is not the causal history of
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this or that specific representation (or representation-type) but rather what makes
representation possible in general. And no answer to this question is satisfactory
unless it gives an answer to the question of representation of the non-existent.
So moving to the idea of representation has not enabled us to get away from
the notion of what a representation is about; that is, its intentional object. For a
representation is a representation of Pegasus not because it necessarily looks like
Pegasus, nor because it is caused by Pegasus, but because it can be used to express
thoughts (intentional states or acts) about Pegasus. A mental representation of
Pegasus just is a thought (of some kind) about Pegasus. But to say that a thought is
about Pegasus is to say that Pegasus is the intentional object of the thought. A
thought’s being about x and x’s being its intentional object are just the same idea. So
as long as we talk about a thought’s being about something, then we are talking in
terms of intentional objects.
That we do employ the idea of a thought’s being about something (and not
just the idea of a thought’s having representational content) is shown by the fact,
noted above, that we can count thoughts as being about the same thing even when
they have different contents. You might be thinking about Napoleon’s exile on Elba, I
might be thinking about his exile on St Helena. There is a sense in which we are
thinking about the same thing: our thoughts have the same object. So we need more
than the idea of content. This is hardly surprising: one of the intuitive glosses which
we put on the notion of intentionality is that it is aboutness. And it is clearly a better
starting-point to say that thoughts are about their objects than to say that they are
about their contents. Thoughts have contents, and it is because of this that they are
about their objects. Retaining the intuitive notion of aboutness means retaining the
intuitive idea of what thoughts are about, and this in turn means retaining the idea of
an intentional object.
In this paper, I have argued that the idea of an intentional object creates an
dilemma for theories of intentionality: either intentional objects are ordinary existing
entities, or they are the kind of entities some of which do not exist. If we say the first
thing, then how do we make sense of intentional objects which do not exist? But if we
say the second, then we have to accept the incredible view that there are non-existent
entities. The way out of this dilemma is to deny an assumption made by each horn:
that being an intentional object is being an entity of some sort. Rather, an intentional
object is just the object (for some subject) of an intentional state or act. Of course, if
all we have to say about intentional objects is that they are what intentional states are
about, and all we have to say about intentional states is that they have objects, then
the proposal is hopelessly circular. But a proper account of intentionality will have
more to say, by giving a detailed account of the nature of various intentional
phenomena. (I do not pretend to have even started on such an account here.)
However, I believe, for the reasons given above, that a theory of intentionality will
not be helped by appealing to causal relations between thoughts and their objects.
And nor do I think that progress would be made by replacing talk of intentional
objects with talk of representation. For a representation (linguistic, pictorial or
mental) is the representation it is partly because of what it is about. And as long as we
continue to make use of the idea of what a mental state is about, then we will need to
make use of the idea of an intentional object.
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